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Rebels at War, Criminals in Peace:
A Critical Approach to Violence in
Colombia
Sebastián Ronderos and Daniel Marín-López
This essay explores the meaning and significance of the Colombian peace agreements
reached by Juan Manuel Santos’s government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia—People’s Army (FARC-EP) on 24 November 2016 vis-à-vis a significant
organizational shift within the national armed conflict and territorial dispute. By
conducting a critical exposition of the armed conflict in Colombia, this essay
contributes to the debate surrounding the (ex-)guerrillas’ demobilization and
disarmament, highlighting the relevance of ideology for analyzing changes in the
dynamics of violence in the so-called postconflict.
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In an interview, Gabriel García Márquez recalled how he had long desired to write
a book in which everything happened: a story that would contain many others and
through them reveal the innermost aspects of the dramas and dreams of Colom-
bia’s history. At the time, he imagined a tale set in a house that would serve as a
larger-than-life daily version of a forgotten story, condemned to endless repeti-
tion. Years later, this household would take the name of Macondo, giving rise
to a fantastic collection of Colombia’s most extreme human enigmas. By
drawing on the civil wars of the nineteenth century and the escalation of biparti-
san warfare after the assassination of the popular leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán (in
1948), García Márquez (1967) depicted the endless exhaustion arising from a vio-
lence that never ceased in a place that knew nothing but violence. Every effort
to appease the passions, silence the rifles, and bring about reconciliation invari-
ably marked the prelude to a new uprising:
Ten days after a joint communiqué by the Government and the opposition
announced the end of the war, there was news of the first armed uprising
of Colonel Aureliano Buendía on the western border. His small and poorly
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armed force was scattered in less than a week. But during that year, while Lib-
erals and Conservatives tried to make the country believe in reconciliation,
he attempted seven other revolts. (75)
Evicted and battered, having seen seventeen of his sons perish after losing thirty-
two civil wars, the weary Aureliano Buendía finally realized the overwhelming
need to put an end to such a bitter war. However, one loose end remained unno-
ticed in the unleashing of new struggles through constant changes in the means of
confrontation, and at its core were inextinguishable political grievances that re-
surfaced vibrantly. Macondo was a powder keg ready to flare up into a bonfire:
When he [Aureliano Buendía] said it he did not know that it was easier to
start a war than to end one. It took him almost a year of fierce and bloody
effort to force the Government to propose conditions of peace favorable to
the rebels and another year to convince his own partisans of the convenience
of accepting them. He went to inconceivable extremes of cruelty to put down
the rebellion of his own officers, who resisted and called for victory, and he
finally relied on enemy forces to make them submit. (87)
By appealing to the imagination, García Márquez emulated the failed implemen-
tation of the peace agreement negotiated between General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla
and the Colombian liberal rebels commanded by Guadalupe Salcedo in 1953. The
precariousness of this amnesty and its inability to contain the hatred engendered
in political violence was seen early on. Many dissidents were killed after it was
signed (Salcedo himself among them). This undermined the stability of the agree-
ment and laid the ground for a persistence of political violence through the orga-
nizational transformation of liberal banditry into guerrilla warfare.
Through his magical reconstruction, García Márquez attempted to reveal the
fundamental explanatory logic of the reproduction of Colombian violence,
which increased against a backdrop of social eruption that swept the entire con-
tinent. Latin America was witnessing the sudden establishment of a de-facto dike
that abruptly delineated its antagonistic frontiers. On one hand was the Cuba of
the First Declaration of Havana, signed on 20 September 1960, which exemplified
the possibility of reaching the “promised land” through popular will, something
regarded as attainable in the Caribbean and that could be replicated throughout
the continent. On the other hand was the Alliance for Progress, an imperious
attempt by the United States to limit the Havana Declaration’s applicability.
However, the local Latin American elites were gradually losing control of their
national leadership and unyieldingly increased the use of repressive state appara-
tuses to exercise their domination. This was often marked by the sponsoring of
electoral fraud and the physical elimination of adversaries. Colombia epitomized
the repressive state during the 1960s and 1970s through a political system known as
the Frente Nacional (National Front), in which the political elites from the tradi-
tional conservative and liberal parties shared power (Gutiérrez Sanín 2007).
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This situation perpetuated the conditions for popular attempts to seize power in
pursuit of freedom. The various Communist Parties throughout the continent
assumed a leading role in organizing such attempts (Pizarro Leongómez 2006).
Many, such as the Venezuelan and Guatemalan Communist Parties, believed
armed struggle was the only feasible way of achieving political transformation.
Others regarded democratic legitimacy as a vitally important condition for any
long-lasting process of social change and took part in the institutional dynamics
of electoral dispute. This was the case in Chile and Argentina. The Colombian
Communist Party (PCC) opted for a military strategy of sustained armed actions
accompanied by the electoral dynamics of democratic disputes within formal
state institutions. It called this approach the combination of all forms of struggle
(Pizarro Leongómez 1991; Ferro and Uribe 2002; Ortiz 2005).
The PCC found fertile ground for these organizational developments after a vic-
torious resistance by “self-defense” groups, which aligned various peasant forces
in southeast Colombia and established the founding myth of guerrilla warfare
after Operation Marquetalia. The rebels, under the leadership of Pedro Antonio
Marin (nom de guerre: Manuel Marulanda) and Luis Alberto Morantes Jaimes
(nom de guerre: Jacobo Arenas), unified the grievances of the rural dispossessed
and occupied the regions of El Pato, El Duda, and Guayabero (jointly known as
Marquetalia in the local argot). On 18 May 1964, 48 rebels were cornered by
16,000 troops from the Colombian army, which was attempting to eradicate the
self-defense groups and regain control of the area (Phelan 2019, 838).
The Colombian military has repeatedly denied U.S. participation in the so-
called operation, formally named Plan Lazo. The officials claimed to have
adopted the term lazo (“tie” in Spanish) because they intended to use siege
tactics against the rebels. However, Dennis Rempe (2002) reveals how this plan
was crafted onWashington’s post–Cuban Revolution counterinsurgency structure
promoted by the Kennedy administration under the Alliance for Progress label.
The term lazo was said to originate from a misreading by local officials of the
acronym LASO, short for Latin American Security Operation. As Ferro and
Uribe (2002, 34) stress, from that day on, the Colombian struggle would no
longer rest solely on the idea of self-defense, as the Marquetalia resistance had
provided the movement with a more structured ideology that unified the rebels
under the banner of a revolutionary guerrilla force. This is apparent in the
words of FARC leader Jacobo Arenas ([1967] 2019, 28; our translation) that,
despite the bloodshed, “the ‘operation’ [against the self-defense groups] provoked
the most formidable national movement of solidarity and inaugurated a new stage
of revolutionary struggles in Colombia. The agrarian movement of Marquetalia
became a guerrilla force with a revolutionary program, and today it is much stron-
ger and more superior than it was before the aggression.”
Although the combination of all forms of struggle was established by the PCC in
1964, the FARC was formally instituted at the guerrillas’ Second Conference in
1966 (Pizarro Leongómez 1991). García Márquez wroteOne Hundred Years of Solitude
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during this sort of interregnum of violence, when bipartisan confrontation refused
to die and when guerrilla warfare had yet to be born. García Márquez seemed to
spot within Pinilla’s “failed negotiations” of 1953 the unequivocal sign of a change
in political violence that was taking shape by the time his Nobel Prize–winning
novel was finally published (in 1967).
Half a century later, Colombia is once again at a crossroads for analyzing its
fate. By signing the Final Accord for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construc-
tion of a Stable and Durable Peace, historical steps have been taken toward putting
an end to the armed conflict. Yet the elites’ negligence in implementing the
accord, and their omission of (or even support for) paramilitary territorial expan-
sion, have opened a vacuum of authority in different regions. The elimination of
political groups has led to a restructuring of various armed criminal forces.
We argue that the affective-mythical dimension is pivotal for understanding
any organizational character and its real meaning within concrete social spaces
of inscription. We believe that this analytical potential harbors productive insights
into the transformation of violence in Colombia. Therefore, the present essay will
rely on the Essex school of discourse theory. Its focus on the affective significance
of ideological structures provides a specific framework for examining the logics
behind the institutionalization, contestation, and sedimentation of social practices
and regimes (Howarth 2013). By relying on a “retroductive” form of reasoning
(Glynos and Howarth 2007), description and explanation/critique of the FARC’s
demobilization can be linked, thereby making sense of the transforming dynamics
and structures of intrastate violence.
Problematizing the Organization of Violence
To understand its impact on the current dynamics of territorial disputes, this essay
will explore the meaning of the demobilization process after the peace agreement
reached by the Juan Manuel Santos government and the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC) on 24 November 2016. To this end,
we will first reconstruct certain constitutive features of the FARC as a politico-mil-
itary organization, thereby providing a clearer understanding of key inherent
characteristics of violent and contentious dynamics. We will further examine
the process of this demobilization and disarmament, highlighting the most strik-
ing features to analyze the implications for the correlation of forces and logics of
criminality in the so-called postconflict.
To a certain extent, over the decades the last three generations of Colombians
have either witnessed or featured in the changing conditions of war, which range
from bipartisan violence in the 1950s to guerrilla warfare against elites in the 1970s
and 1980s to the violence of drug trafficking in the 1990s, with confrontation
between guerrilla factions, the state’s security forces, criminal gangs, paramilitar-
ies, and drug traffickers.
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Since the nineteenth century, the unequivocally constant factor has been the
dispossession of entire populations plunged into despair and helplessness as
the traditional elites have attempted to uphold their position of power. Centuries
of violence perpetrated the exodus of a people from their customs and traditions,
alienating them from their own memory in a pattern of uprooting. This social dis-
placement has been crude and extreme. As described by Rochlin (2011, 717), fierce
local feuds and confrontation between liberals and conservatives during the 1800s
resulted in the largest civil war in Latin America in the nineteenth century (War of
a Thousand Days, 1899–1902):
Somewhere between 80,000 and 200,000 Colombians lost their lives during
that imbroglio. That exhausting ordeal appeared to deflate the country’s pro-
pensity toward violence until another horrific round of carnage slowly sim-
mered and then boiled over with La Violencia during the period 1948–1958.
At least 200,000 Colombians lost their lives in that final contest between the
Liberals and Conservatives. With La Violencia behind it, Colombia during the
1960s continued to witness the highest rate of violent deaths in the world.
Between 1958 and 2010, close to a million people were killed, and another 7.5
million were displaced internally (Unidad para las Víctimas 2020).
The expectation of a significant reduction in the levels of violence after a nego-
tiated agreement therefore appeared reasonable, especially since the peace
process laid down the common establishment of regulations and institutions, al-
lowing for investigation into and mediation of social conflicts and the elimination
of the zero-sum game assumed in warfare. Colombia seemed to confirm this
logical derivation, as it witnessed overwhelming reductions in forced displace-
ments, kidnappings, victims of antipersonnel mines, and murders of both civilians
and (ex-)combatants in the immediate postaccord period.
However, studies in the analysis of long-duration conflicts raise the alarm,
showing that over 60 percent of armed conflicts worldwide relapse into violence
five years after their “resolution” (von Einsiedel et al. 2017). Some scholars stress
the vulnerability of the process when it involves disarming only one of the con-
flicting parties (Walter 1997). Others pinpoint the axial importance of identifying
and controlling possible spoilers to the agreed agenda (Stedman 1997; Nasi 2006).
For their part, Forman and Patrick (2000) focus on the need to secure the domestic
and international resources required to guarantee the implementation of peace
agreements. Galtung (1998) and Lederach (1998) insist on the importance of estab-
lishing a coherent framework in the promotion of reconciliation among civilians
affected by a conflict. Clumsy application, incompetence, or lack of mutual polit-
ical will throughout the implementation of a negotiated peace agreement can
result in the transformation and intensification of violence.
Although the field of conflict studies has achieved significant milestones in un-
derstanding complex, contentious dynamics, this literature seems to reproduce a
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mechanistic point of view in relation to violence, often taking violence as a mere
epiphenomenon of the undercurrents of the economic sphere or as an irrational
symptom that invariably indicates a fault in the formal state’s institutional frame-
work, distancing it from its political character. In conflict studies’ mainstream lit-
erature, the conundrum of peace can be unclogged by discerning (and unravelling)
passions from rationality, installing stability through mere normative rationality.
Ultimately, this view takes the link between ideology and affect for granted and
does not attempt to (theoretically or empirically) explain the connection in any
manner. By bridging this gap, one can conduct a critical exposition of the
armed conflict in Colombia from an affective viewpoint of ideology (Glynos and
Howarth 2007), accounting for the structure and agency of the FARC, the affect
surrounding it as a political and military organization, and the impact of the guer-
rillas’ demobilization and disarmament in the current dynamics of violence.
A Discourse-Theory Approach to Violence?
From the margins of Marxist theory—mostly drawing on the works of Antonio
Gramsci and Louis Althusser—Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe developed a
conceptualization of discourse whose scope is not restricted to a purely linguistic
phenomenon. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) estab-
lished that all objects and actions have a meaning constituted by systems of sig-
nificant differences. This array of various interacting signifying elements gives
way to wider discursive structures that ultimately formulate explanations for
(and constructions of) social life. Yet, as no representation of society is ever
capable of capturing the totality of social experience, any form of representation
is always limited and can therefore be challenged (112). As aptly put by Glynos
(2001, 197), “From this perspective, the opposition is not between representations
of society on the one hand and society as such on the other, but between repre-
sentations of society and the failure of representation itself.” Therefore, if dis-
course for Laclau and Mouffe refers to the structures of symbolic systems that
shape every social formation, then the task of discourse analysis is to examine
their political construction and function, as well as the concrete conditions allow-
ing their existence.
Under the label of post-Marxism, these seminal reflections came to constitute a
field of research in its own right. Not that the discourse-theory approach has re-
mained untouched by criticism: as it derives from Marxist perspectives, concerns
arose over its abandonment of economic analysis, with critics asserting the need to
consider both the political and economic dimensions (see Diskin and Sandler
1993). However, rather than presuming a sort of analytical imperialism that
would emphasize politics at the expense of other layers of social life, we believe
discourse theory can construct productive insights, allowing further analysis
through interconnections with different social dimensions (and fields of research).
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And discourse theory’s importance assumes a dominant role when one notes the
limited attention given by analysts and commentators to the affective and ideolog-
ical significance of those players with a stake in the Colombian armed conflict,
particularly when it comes to the FARC. Far from the rationalist perspective
(and normative focus) of conflict studies, discourse theory takes the affect as a con-
stitutive feature in the construction of social experience (Ronderos 2021).
When normative debates on peace and violence are put aside, ideology comes
to the fore as a key aspect of social dynamics, with profound analytic potential.
The invocation of the term ideology within discourse theory refers not solely to
the principles and ideas present in an organization, party, or movement but
also, perhaps more importantly, to the way subjects and collectivities affectively
engage with these institutions (Glynos 2020). The affective turn in discourse
theory emphasizes the function of ideological discourses as a form of emotional
investment and mythic attachment (fantasy-constructed narrative) in different
kinds of social representation (see Laclau 2005; Glynos 2008; Glynos and
Howarth 2007). The myth functions as a means “to ‘cover-over’ or conceal the sub-
ject’s lack by providing a fantasy of wholeness or harmony” that, when success-
fully installed, can crystallize collective social imaginaries and ignite (or
prevent) social change (Howarth 2013, 247). To grasp the emotional significance
within discursivity, the analyst must develop thick descriptions and fill in the
gap between biography and representation. This is precisely what we intend to
explore in the organizational structure of the FARC.
We will rely on discourse theory and insightful contributions within Marxism
to construct a cross-fertilization for analyzing contemporary armed-confrontation
dynamics from an affective perspective of ideology. In concrete terms, we are inter-
ested in examining the affective dimension of discursivity as an underlying invest-
ment that exhibits particularities of ideological significance, highlighting themyth’s
role in such a discursive articulation (Laclau 1997; Howarth 2013). By referencing
(post-)Marxist insights on ideology, we aim to unblock meaningful elements sur-
rounding the FARC and their analytical relevance for understanding vital political
logics being enacted within the transformation of violence in Colombia.
The FARC at War
The Colombian armed conflict underwent a transition from a “guerrilla force
without a war” to a “guerrilla force with a war,” and 1978 is regarded by several
authors as the turning point between these phases (Pizarro Leongómez 1991;
Ferro and Uribe 2002; Gutiérrez Sanin 2004).
After a huge social mobilization in the Paro (“strike”) of 1977, a second wave of
rebel leaders such as Luis Édgar Devia (nom de guerre: Raúl Reyes) joined the
FARC and made the organization a stronghold in southeast Colombia. This
same period marked the apogee of the coca-growing economy, on which the
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FARC—consisting of about six hundred members—was dependent in the mid-
1980s. This became its primary source of financing, accompanied by recurring kid-
nappings, racketeering, bank raids, blackmail, and extortion. During the 1990s the
FARC experienced strong growth in its sustained confrontation with the Colom-
bian army (from 94 confrontations in 1990 to 697 in 2002). It also consolidated its
involvement as a full-fledged drug cartel in a highly profitable illegal market (Gu-
tiérrez Sanin 2004, 265). This remarkable expansion was accompanied by a decline
in civilian support for the rebels as the conflict reached brutal levels of noncombat
victimization. The FARC significantly increased its involvement in the number of
massacres and victims, yet it was still outdone by the brutal paramilitary alliance
backed by important segments of the elite.
A major strategic shift is observed in the literature on the FARC’s territorial ex-
pansion. Echandía (1999) noted a strong causal relationship between the beliefs
and grievances of the locals and occupation by guerrilla forces, as the FARC ini-
tially sought to expand its influence by establishing order and control over regions
in which the absence of authority presented favorable conditions for its political
agenda. However, Pizarro Leongómez (2006) stated that, from the 1980s onward,
the FARC started expanding into regions that were economically profitable (i.e.,
regions producing/extracting bananas, gold, oil, coal, and coca). The guerrillas’
strategic plans were strengthened by the appropriation of these substantial re-
sources. By the early 1990s, the FARC had expanded its guerrilla fronts through-
out the country, extending the space of militarized territory and more or less
successfully dispersing the National Army. This marked a shift from guerrilla
warfare to a war of movements.
Following the government’s attack on the FARC’s high-command secretariat in
La Uribe on 9 December 1990, a “full-scale war” was in full swing. The rebels
began concentrating forces in the south, particularly in the departments (politi-
cal-administrative regions) of Putumayo, Guaviare, Nariño, Caquetá, and Meta.
This would give rise to a pivotal military realignment. After the Eighth Confer-
ence in April 1993, regional blocks and adjacent commands were created as part
of a mobile campaign, expanding throughout the country and turning inhospita-
ble zones into strategic rearguard areas.
Phelan (2019) highlights a key point for understanding the cohesive organiza-
tional structure of the FARC, associated with its political agenda. After Marqueta-
lia, the bases of the FARC’s objectives were outlined in the Agrarian Programme of
the FARC-EP Guerrillas, which was deeply rooted in the historical peasant struggle
for land. As such, the FARC’s grounding political structure developed from griev-
ances expressed through the local experience of “self-defense” and not as an intel-
lectual (and merely strategic) impersonation of a foreign experience, which was
the case, for example, with the National Liberation Army (ELN), which originated
from the attempt to create the same intellectual spark in Colombia that ignited the
military dynamism of the Cuban Revolution. As aptly put by Gutiérrez Sanin
(2004, 275): “The self-defense ideology is powerful within FARC because it
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operates in the intersection area of biography and history, giving the FARC
members the tools to interpret articulately their personal experience in a bigger
explanatory frame of collective destiny.”
This local articulation would undeniably broaden itself, as the FARC further
elaborated its Agrarian Programme at the guerrillas’ Eighth Conference in 1993.
This is the point when the guerrilla and the more orthodox Marxist views of
the PCC definitively parted ways, with the latter’s focal influence, represented
by the figure of Gilberto Vieira, taking over. Vieira was a cofounder of the PCC
in 1930 and served as general secretary from 1947 to 1991. He was one of the first
Latin American communists to hail the character of Simón Bolívar through a non-
reductionist perspective, approaching Marxism as “a science, not a dogma” (Har-
necker 1988, 3). Vieira headed a de-Stalinist and Leninist reconstruction of the
PCC in the 1940s, redefining a dogmatism that he believed had held back the rev-
olutionary potential within the Latin American context.
This view was explicitly assumed by the FARC two years after Vieira left his
position as the PCC’s general secretary. The guerrillas then drew up an ideological
morphology structured around grievances embedded in agrarian self-defense
struggles since the 1920s combined with a Bolivarian construal of sovereignty
vis-à-vis Marxist-Leninist principles, both unambiguously shown in the introduc-
tion to the FARC’s Eighth Conference statutes: “The FARC-EP apply the funda-
mental principles of Marxism-Leninism to the Colombian situation and are
governed by their Strategic Plan and Revolutionary Program, the conclusions of
their National Conferences, the Plenums of their Central General Secretary,
and their Internal Regulations; they are inspired by Liberator Simón Bolívar’s rev-
olutionary thought on anti-imperialism, Latin American unity, equality, and
popular well-being. They also advocate the creation of a genuine Bolivarian
Army” (FARC-EP [1993] 2019, 7; our translation).
FARC leaders were aware that any ostentatious enjoyment of wealth would
weaken the guerrillas’ unity and combative capacity and would establish regula-
tory and bureaucratic constraints on the combatants. Guerrilla members received
no form of individual income, with no regular wage, no share of the spoils, no
family life, and no real hope of escaping the war. They had committed themselves
to a lifetime of fighting only avoidable through death. Nevertheless, the FARC at
an early stage built an organizational capacity that allowed for an unending con-
flict: “Despite this, FARC’s members generally fight with great verve. There are
exceptions, but as a rule their behavior in combat exhibits both skill and motiva-
tion against opponents endowed with better technical means. On the defensive,
they do not fall apart, and only at the margin does the group suffer defections”
(Gutiérrez Sanin 2004, 271).
These points display a trait of the guerrilla acknowledged by few, against the
standard image propagated by mass media through the decades, which presents
the Colombian insurgency as caused by a terrorist organization, plainly criminal,
whose expansion was only made possible by drug trafficking. In Althusserian
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terms, the organizational character of the insurgency represents not only an
“omission that has not been divulged, but, on the contrary, [it is] consecrated as
a non-omission, and proclaimed as fullness” (Althusser and Balibar 1968, 31).
But the FARC was far removed from this one-dimensional image portraying it
as a narco-terrorist organization. The guerrillas maintained an ironclad hierarchi-
cal structure, with stable control of its commands, a permanent presence in
twenty-five of the thirty-two departments at the national level, and the ability
to implement international humanitarian law at a level comparable to that of
the Colombian state. These conditions allowed the guerrillas to exercise control
in their zones of influence, generating stability and territorial rulership, to a
greater or lesser degree.
This is not to say that drug trafficking played no role in expanding the armed
conflict and financial sustainability of the FARC as an organization, but at no
point did it offer an ostentatious lifestyle to its members (whose casualties were
systemically higher vis-à-vis the Colombian army). Economic incentives appear
highly unlikely to explain how the FARC managed to remain cohesive for over
half a century. Indeed, as the Colombian war became increasingly criminal, the
FARC also strengthened its political character. How do we approach such a
conundrum?
Ideological structure must be stressed as a significant component through
which the FARC maintained coherence and articulation over a broadly lucrative
and criminalized extended civil war. Pehlan (2019, 5) clearly explains how the
FARC’s political agenda had remained highly consistent since the movement’s
birth. The guerrillas’ founding demands were kept at the core of the organization
until its demobilization and were copiously referred to in the Final Accord for the
Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Durable Peace. The
FARC’s Agrarian Programme systemically urged the establishment of a broad
rural credit system, property titles for tenant farmers and peasants, the provision
of adequate health and education services in the countryside, the protection of in-
digenous communities, and land demarcation. Many of these items formed the
core of the 2016 peace agreement’s first point, which dealt with comprehensive
rural reform: “By reconciling key FARC grievances pertaining to agrarian
reform, social justice, political representation for the rural population and those
marginalized, and the nature of the country’s political system, the Agreement
has also served to provide incentives and space for the FARC to pursue objectives
democratically through its new political party” (Phelan 2019, 848).
Marquetalia, as a harsh displacement of agrarian-liberal social structures, had
assumed a mythical role capable of stimulating and articulating nodal points
between historical rural struggles, the potential enclosed in Marxist-Leninist
theory (adapted to these particular conditions), and the anti-imperialist significance
within Simón Bolivar’s legacy, together crystalizing a very peculiar ideological mor-
phology. As expressed by Ernesto Laclau (1990, 30), the constitution of the subject is
nothing but the “distance” between the undecidability of the structure and the
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moment of decision; therefore, dislocation provides room for the rearticulation of
different forms of (collective and individual) subjectivity, launching social change.
Such an articulation demands a great deal of awareness of the constructed
nature of the social surface and of the “psychological” role taken by ideology to
“‘organise’ human masses” and give shape to “popular beliefs” (Gramsci 1971,
377). This undoubtedly provided the rebels with a strong structure of affective
bonds, of a common identification endowed with a promising emancipatory po-
tential delineating possible political horizons through concrete circumstances of
struggle. Laclau (1997, 315), following Gramsci’s (1971) recognition of George
Sorel’s conception of the mythical, took myth as a key point for theorizing the con-
stitution of a social link. In Howarth’s (2013, 163) words, “The work of myth is to
repair the dislocations experienced by subjects in particular situations by provid-
ing a new principle of reading of a situation.” Marquetalia can be seen as an
example of this in the Colombian context, and the FARC’s organizational cohe-
sion can therefore be explained as an effect of the skillful articulation of a myth-
ical construction of collective identities. This mobilization of common affects was
able, in turn, to structure a robust yet hermetic military and political force with
firm principles and objectives.
It is worth understanding, however, how the ideological synthesis articulated
after the events in Marquetalia assumed an ambiguous character in terms of mil-
itary strategy, mainly from 1990 onward. As the PCC’s and the FARC’s ideological
structures took a heterodox course to combat a restraining dogmatism that had
held back the revolutionary process in Latin America, they failed to account for
the complexity of the demographic realignment of the Colombian population
(progressively urbanized, rooted in Catholicism, and subjected to the elites’
liberal-conservative hegemony). Following Gramsci (1971), consent in this situation
was largely created and exercised within “civil-society” institutions (churches,
schools, media, etc.).
Vieira’s conversation with Harnecker (1988, 14) also delved into this discussion.
The former PCC leader stressed how the PCC’s split from the Chinese Maoists
was due to a dogmatism that neglected the nature of social processes, with
Mao’s postulate that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” emphasized
pejoratively. Nevertheless, from the 1990s onward, the FARC seemed to take this
Maoist catchphrase as its military maxim, gradually losing its more extensive and
transversal social base. FARC support was eventually restricted to very specific
social movements in their zones of influence, and this ultimately weakened the
FARC’s capacity to defy the elites’ national leadership, particularly as the
balance between the state and civil society began to change radically.
In short, this ideological component acted to cement the guerrillas’ internal
structure. Yet, if such a mythical-affective structure enabled the FARC to
sustain an armed confrontation, this structure was limited in its means for achiev-
ing ultimate success. Such was the conclusion that both the FARC and a section of
the elite, headed by Juan Manuel Santos, would finally reach.
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A War without a Guerrilla Force
Without doubt, the FARC repeatedly stated its willingness to find a political sol-
ution to the civil war, and it engaged in a series of negotiations at different stages
of Colombia’s political history. In the FARC’s own words, “We were always com-
mitted throughout the different moments of our history to search for a political
solution. That is why we initiated dialogue processes in La Uribe in 1984; then
in Tlaxcala in 1992; later in El Caguán as of January 1999; and, more recently, in
Havana since November 2012, having signed the ‘General Agreement for the Ter-
mination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Durable Peace’”
(FARC-EP 2016).
Likewise, the context was favorable for the agreement not only because of the
guerrillas’ isolation in relation to the masses but because the FARC (though it still
had the military capacity to extend the conflict for another half century) had been
significantly reduced since 1998, by the modernization and realignment of the Co-
lombian army backed by the U.S. military via Plan Colombia. Another factor was
the abrupt expansion of paramilitary groups with wide support from local and na-
tional elites. So “the will and political decision of the Government of Juan Manuel
Santos” presented itself as a convenient way out of an exhausting, contentious
confrontation (FARC-EP 2016).
Yet additional elements can provide further explanations for understanding the
FARC’s move from war to peace, and here, we believe, the ideological remains
paramount. Coming from a rural background, Manuel Marulanda had organized
the resistance in Marquetalia and had become a legend after enduring the blow of
the Operación. He had been responsible for coordinating political and military
structures. His experience in the campesino resistance in the late 1940s had
made him highly pessimistic about any mediated solution with the national
elites, and the FARC’s revolutionary propaganda had turned him into an inspiring
leader. When Guillermo León Sáenz (nom de guerre: Alfonso Cano) became com-
mander after Marulanda’s death from a heart attack in 2008, a political solution to
the armed conflict became the guerrillas’most desired objective. Cano, one of the
few guerrilla leaders with an urban outlook, had less influence with FARC’s more
militaristic elements and profoundly believed that a political resolution with sec-
tions of the elite could be achieved.
This change of command brought about a swift change in the guerrillas’ dis-
course, and a new consensus was reached within its military elements. The
thirty-thesis manifesto that originated from the Tenth Conference epitomized
the FARC’s renewed understanding of revolutionary mobilization (FARC-EP
2016). For the FARC, this period of negotiations was a tipping point for at least
three main conditions: First was the realization that armed confrontation had
widened a gap between the political and military structures (favoring the latter).
Second was recognition by the state of FARC political motivations, reinforcing
conditions for a solution by dialogue (salida dialogada). Third was the Havana
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process, which reinvigorated some courses of action that the FARC had histori-
cally formulated. For the guerrillas, the Havana process echoed the 1964 Agrarian
Programme of the FARC-EP Guerrillas and the 1982 Eighth Conference, emphasizing
unresolved issues such as land distribution (FARC-EP 2016). As a result, the agree-
ment officially constituted yet another step in a long sequence of struggles that
incorporated the signifier peace within a dialectical, discursive narrative of revolu-
tionary coherence. The FARC’s cohesion during the civil war was evident in its
decisive resolution to put an end to the war. Only an organization with such a
mythical-affective foundation could abruptly silence the same rifles that had
fired across the Colombian landscape for over half a century.
Prior to the peace agreement, the FARC consisted of 13,302 members, including
combatants, imprisoned guerrillas, and unarmed militia (Kroc Institute 2020, 57).
After signing the agreement, the FARC demobilized 6,800 active members, dis-
mantled its militia network, and handed 8,994 military devices over to the
United Nations. These included state-of-the-art weapons such as Browning .50
calibers, AK-47 machine guns, and industrial-type mortars (an average of 1.32
weapons per combatant and 72 tons of metal in total). The FARC disarmament’s
arms-to-combatant ratio is unmatched when compared to other agreements to
end long-lasting intrastate conflicts (Valencia 2017). Furthermore, any interna-
tional model of successful demobilization assumes a remaining dissident faction
of between 10 and 15 percent of former members. This is regarded as normal.
The number of FARC dissidents—those who are still active—is estimated at
between 800 and 1,200 combatants, somewhere between 6 and 10 percent of the
overall number of its members. This fact takes on greater significance when
one recalls that the dissident paramilitary faction amounted to around 22
percent in the aftermath of their agreements with the Alvaro Uribe Velez admin-
istration and is currently expanding rapidly throughout the country. In other
words, the FARC has fully complied with demobilization and disarmament pro-
cesses and has definitively ceased to exist as a guerrilla force (see Ronderos 2020).
On the other hand, the withdrawal of an armed player of such size and cohesion
has created, in turn, a considerable vacuum of territorial authority. For decades,
the FARC administered a system of regulation over licit and illicit markets
through which other regional players acted. If 1978 marked a decisive transition
in the armed conflict (from a “guerrilla force without a war” to a “guerrilla
force with a war”), then 2017 marked a shift toward a “war without a guerrilla
force,” creating a vacancy of command and authority over a population, resources,
and territories.
Death without Interruptions
Those who have ever challenged the Colombian political and economic elites and
have then subjected themselves to an amnesty granted by these elites have paid a
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fee in blood. There are no exceptions. These include the legendary liberal rebel
Guadalupe Salcedo—whose death was for García Márquez one of the detonators
that fueled a continuity of violence in the late 1950s. Other examples are the an-
nihilation of the Patriotic Union (UP), when more than three thousand members
were systematically assassinated in what amounted to a political genocide, and the
death of the charismatic commander of the M-19 guerrilla force, Carlos Pizarro
Leongómez. Each and every one paid the price for the desired peace and social
justice—which have yet to be attained—with their lives.
Although a long time has passed, some of Colombia’s problems remain the
same. At least 132 FARC ex-combatants and 35 of their relatives have been
killed since the signing of the agreement (INDEPAZ 2019), a scale 23 times
higher than the national homicide rate (Kroc Institute 2020, 13). If the beginning
of 2017 pointed toward a reduction in violence, 2018 set a pace for the reverse
trend. Since the signing of the peace agreement, more than 702 regional leaders
have been assassinated across twenty-eight of Colombia’s thirty-two administra-
tive departments, with 2018 as the peak year (INDEPAZ 2019, 9). Of these, 499
were associated with peasant organizations, indigenous and African-descended
communities, environmentalist movements, and communal agrarian struggles
over land, territory, and natural resources, representing 71.08 percent of the
total number of homicides (24). Most of the killings have taken place in areas of
historic FARC influence and high levels of poverty.
The guerrillas’ demobilization has been a new social dislocation that has altered
the fundamental reality of war, making room for communities to organize and
promote local initiatives of collective action. Indeed, “social dislocations may
lead to the construction of new collective wills and political forces, which can
link together different agents that may bring about or stall social change”
(Howarth 2013, 162). In parallel, the elites, organized within the state, have
shown an unwillingness to encourage institutional capacity in former FARC
zones of influence.
This social scenario has created the perfect situation for a dispute between local
landowners and criminal factions—many stemming from paramilitary groups
conveniently forgotten in the peace agreement, despite the FARC and civil orga-
nizations warning the government of their increasing military actions throughout
the country. These factions’ main targets have been the newly organized commu-
nities and their forms of (individual or collective) leadership. The current confron-
tations are largely motivated by control over territory and over coca crops,
suppliers, traders, and trafficking corridors. These have been focused on the de-
partments of Meta and Guaviare—with their river access to the Amazon (along
the Miraflores-Vaupés axis) and Venezuela (through Guainía and Vichada)—
and on the repositioning on the Pacific coast of Nariño and Cauca.
Guarantees in the truth, justice, and reparations process have been under-
mined. The current government steadily opposes transitional-justice mechanisms
such as the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) and the Truth Commission and
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claims that these institutions “seek impunity for narco-terrorists.” The govern-
ment is now aiming to impose greater penalties on ex-guerrillas, forcing the extra-
dition of their most visible leaders through false accusations. This was revealed in
the case of FARC spokesperson Seuxis Pausías Hernández Solarte (nom de guerre:
Jesús Santrich; see Insight Crime 2021). The government at the same time provides
incentives for ex-combatants to return to clandestine activities. Many of them now
put their combat experience at the service of the newly organized armed struc-
tures that occupy the FARC’s historic areas of influence (Johnson and Vélez 2020).
Like the biblical hurricane—impatient, full of voices from the past and
murmurs of former generations—whose anger transformed García-Márquez’s
Macondo into a whirlwind of dust and rubble, Colombia’s status quo remains
trapped in recurrent events, perpetuating a nostalgia that will perhaps extend
itself for a hundred more years of solitude.
Conclusions
The present essay has undertaken a critical discursive analysis of the FARC from
an affective viewpoint of ideology. By constructing a thick description of the
FARC’s trajectory and of its mythical structuring as a political and military orga-
nization, we have drawn vital explanatory logics that may explain the guerrilla
group’s cohesion over a long period and within an increasingly criminalized
context.
The construction of this critical exploration of the FARC has also allowed us to
explain vital conditions for its transit from war to peace and to further assess the
impact of this transit vis-à-vis the transformation of violence dynamics. This ana-
lytic move—almost completely overlooked in the mainstream literature of conflict
studies—has shown a prodigious explanatory capacity for understanding both
evocative elements within the relationship between affect, discourse, and
agency and also the effect of such mediation in concrete areas of analysis.
As a result, we believe the in-depth study of the discursive composition of or-
ganizations in how they structure their own ideological (and affective) significance
can contribute significantly to the explanation of contentious social dynamics. Re-
thinking (post-)Marxism and further exploring (and exploiting) its critical poten-
tial for conducting political and economic analysis will greatly benefit the study of
armed confrontation and social struggle.
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